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Low-skilled workers enjoy a large wage advantage in German works council 
establishments.  Since job tenure is also longer for these workers, one explanation might 
be rent-seeking. If the premium is a compensating wage differential (or a return to 
unmeasured ability), it should not lead to higher tenure; whereas if it is (partly) rent, 
lower quits should lead to longer tenure at plants with works councils. Our analysis uses 
the Card and de la Rica (2006) tenure model, and although the association between skill 
level and the works council tenure gap is positive it fails to achieve statistical significance 
in a single equation framework. However, running the tenure equation for separate skill 
quintiles, we find that those with the highest wage premium have the greatest tenure. As a 
result, although we cannot be certain that the works council wage mark-up of low-skilled 
workers is necessarily a non-competitive rent, the observed pattern of job tenure across 
different skill subsamples is not after all inconsistent with rent-seeking behavior.   1
Introduction 
In an important paper on European collective bargaining published in this Review, Card 
and de la Rica (2006) examine the effect of firm bargaining – ‘firm-specific contracts’ – 
on wages in a system where wages are typically determined under sectoral collective 
bargaining with extension. The immediate context is Spain but the wider collective 
bargaining framework of a network of sectoral contracts overlaid with optional firm-
specific agreements is European, mimicking similar arrangements in countries such as 
Italy and the Netherlands. Firm-specific bargaining in Spain takes place in negotiations 
between management and works councils of worker representatives. Such negotiations 
cover around 15 percent of Spanish workers. The authors report that decentralized 
bargaining of this nature is associated with a wage premium in the range 5 to 10 percent, 
with larger increases for more highly skilled workers.  
The novel aspect of the Card-de la Rica study is the use of data on tenure to 
address the vexed question of whether or not the premium associated with local 
bargaining is evidence of rent seeking or simply a compensating wage differential for 
higher effort levels (as might result from the payment of efficiency wages). The basic 
idea is simply this: if the premium is a compensating wage differential (or a return to 
unmeasured ability), it should not lead to higher tenure, whereas if it is rent or partly rent 
lower quits should lead to longer tenure at plants with firm-specific contracts. In 
particular, by analyzing the wage mark-up associated with a specific institution across 
broad skill groups and then looking at the relationship between tenure and the selected 
measure of skill one should be in a position to evaluate whether workers with a higher 
wage premium are those who have a relatively higher tenure.    2
We apply this methodology to German works councils. Although the bargaining 
role of works councils is potentially very different in Germany than in Spain (e.g. the 
prohibitions on strikes and local bargaining in the absence of express  contractual 
language to the contrary in the relevant sectoral master agreement), it is widely 
acknowledged that the German institution has a distinct bargaining capacity and a 
positive influence on earnings (Addison, Teixeira, and Zwick, 2010). 
A complication of the German situation is of course that there is another type of 
firm-specific plant agreement, negotiated between the (industrial) union and the firm. 
Such agreements are separate from sectoral or industry-level collective bargaining 
agreements,
1 so that there is no two-tier system per se in which unions subsequently 
negotiate at the workplace higher wages than laid down in the master agreement. Any 
such supplementary mechanism is confined to the actions of the works council institution 
which is formally independent of unions. Moreover, collective agreements at firm level 
are still not very common, covering well under 10 percent of firms and workers. One 
reason for this, apart from the existence of works councils, is that master agreements do 
not prevent firms from paying more than what has been agreed to by their bargaining 
agent at sectoral level, while at another level they have acquired flexibility via opening 
clauses allowing for hours and wage derogations from the centralized wage contracts. 
That said, it would be idle to pretend that the relation between sectoral collective 
agreements, ‘substitute’ firm-level agreements, and ‘complementary’ formal/informal 
works council agreements is at all well understood. We will have occasion to return to 
this nexus below, noting here that it shapes our decision to look to different works 
council effects by broad collective bargaining (and absence of collective bargaining). But   3
at a purely descriptive level the tendency in recent years has been for a decline in both 
sectoral collective bargaining and union agreements at firm level, with the result that an 
increasing number of establishments are today not covered by a formal collective 
bargaining agreement. 
 The present paper builds on our earlier analysis in this Review of works council 
effects (Addison, Teixeira, and Zwick, 2010) in which we reported that works councils 
are associated with higher earnings, ceteris paribus. Interestingly, we found that the 
positive earnings influence is stronger for usually disadvantaged worker groups, such as 
women and the low skilled. These differences allow us to identify worker groups that 
benefit more than others from the presence of works councils and look at their tenure. We 
therefore seek to determine whether the observed mark-up enjoyed by such groups is 
indicative of rents or instead of compensating advantages using the tenure approach 
suggested by Card and de la Rica. Pending improved analysis of the accuracy of 
purported shifts in collective bargaining status, we shall not attempt to use panel 
estimation methods to tackle the selection of firms into the different bargaining regimes. 
Nor on this occasion – to keep the analysis as transparent as possible – will we seek to fit 
a probit model to works council incidence. 
 
Methodology 
Defining the predicted wage (skill) quintiles 
Let us assume that the wage of individual i, i y , is determined by 
(1)                     i i j i j i i u B Z B X B X y + + + = ) ( 2 ) ( 2 1 1 ,   4
where, X1i, X2j(i), and Zj(i) denote the characteristics of workers, co-workers in the same 
establishment, and establishments, respectively. Note that the X2j(i) term, in particular, is 
included to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity, the maintained hypothesis 
being that workers with higher unobserved ability will tend to have co-workers with 
higher average skills and conversely for workers with low unobserved ability. (Time 
subscripts are omitted given the cross-sectional nature of our linked employer-employee 
data.) 
To obtain a simple index of skill, we fit model (1) to the sample of non-works 
council employees and use the estimated coefficients to predict the wages of all workers. 
Then, based on the obtained predicted wage, each individual is allocated to the 
corresponding quintile (Card, 1996). By construction, the five groups are 
‘uncontaminated’ by the pay structure of the works council jobs. An alternative approach 
– and indeed that followed by Card and de la Rica (2006) – is to use the observed wage 
distribution to calculate the different wage quintiles and then to estimate ordered probit 
models to predict the probability that a given individual would earn a wage in one of the 
five quintile ranges; and, in a second step, to weight each observation according to the 
predicted probability of earning a wage in the given quintile
2 in quintile-specific wage 
regressions.  In the interests of simplicity, we follow the first route. 
We also decided on this occasion not to control for the potential bias arising from 
establishment- (and worker-) specific factors possibly correlated with the determination 
of works council status.
3 For its part, selection into collective bargaining coverage is dealt 
with by simply providing separate estimates of works council ‘effects’ for covered and   5
uncovered establishments, aggregating over the two types of collective agreement (i.e. 
both sectoral and firm).
4 
Job tenure 
As hypothesized earlier, the payment of higher wages in works council establishments 
may reflect either the ability of works councils to extract a bigger slice of the pie (joint 
surplus) or the ability of firms to elicit greater effort from workers (e.g. via the payment 
of efficiency wages). In the former case, workers are paid above ‘normal’ or market-
clearing wages and, all else constant, we should observe higher tenure Ti. In the latter 
case, establishments pay a compensating differential so that no correlation between 
tenure and works council status should be expected. 
To test these conflicting hypotheses, we first specify the following base model 
(2)   i i j j j i i e Woco B Z B X B X T + + + + = δ ) ( 2 2 1 1 ,                        
where the parameter δ  gives the estimated relationship between tenure and establishment 
workplace representation status. Given job tenure is higher in works council 
establishments (see below), we expect that  0 > δ . Then, given that skill has been proxied 
by predicted (works council-free) wages, a simple and direct way of testing whether the 
tenure gap varies across the skill distribution  is to add an interaction term between the 
works dummy,  ) (i j Woco , and the skill index,  i y ˆ , to yield 
(3)   i i j i i j j j i i e Woco y Woco B Z B X B X T + + + + + = γ δ ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 * ˆ . 
In this framework,  0 < γ  indicates that the lower the skill level the higher the works 
council tenure gap. 
By definition, fitting model (3) across the entire sample gives the average effect 
of the skill index on tenure. Given the descriptive statistics (viz. a works council wage   6
effect that is larger for the least skilled), it is likely that the average effect captured via a 
single regression will be not flexible enough. An alternative and preferred route, 
therefore, is to run models (2) and (3) for the separate skill subsamples (or predicted 
wage quintiles), compare Card (1996). 
 
Data 
Our data set is fully described in Addison, Teixeira, and Zwick (2010). Accordingly, we 
shall only identify the more important aspects here. The main change in the present 
treatment is that we now focus exclusively on western Germany for reasons connected 
with the right censoring of the key tenure variable in the raw data. For western Germany, 
the tenure data are top censored at 25 years for 9 percent of the sample as compared with 
just 10 years for 35 percent of the sample in eastern Germany. Predicted tenure for 
workers in western Germany with censored tenure was generated by running censored 
tenure regressions in 20 cells differentiated by gender, education and nationality. 
The raw data source is the 2001 LIAB, a nationally-representative linked 
employer-employee data set provided by the Institute for Employment Research (Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung). The LIAB matches employee records gathered 
by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) with plant-level data 
from the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB-Betriebspanel). The employment register (IAB 
Beschäftigtenstichprobe, IABS) includes  information on the individual’s three-digit 
occupation, daily gross wage (up to the earnings ceiling for social security contributions – 
see below),
 gender, year of birth, nationality, marital status, number of children, and level   7
of schooling/training. Each individual record also contains the establishment identifier, 
allowing the matching of the individual with the establishment-level information.  
The plant information is based on a stratified random sample – the strata are for 
16 industries and 10 employment size classes – from the population of all establishments 
employing at least one employee paying social security contributions. (Larger plants are 
over-sampled, but within each cell the sampling is random.) The main feature of this IAB 
survey is its extensive description of the labor force at plant-level, including the overall 
wage bill, training provision, hours worked, overtime payments, and collective 
bargaining and works council status. The IAB establishment panel file also includes 
questions concerning the establishment’s sales, exports, investment expenditures, age, 
and corporate form/legal status.  
Our sectoral coverage is restricted to manufacturing and services, and not-for-
profit organizations are excluded. Further, we include only those establishments in which 
works councils can be elected, which in practice means that workers in plants with less 
than five employees are dropped. After applying these filters, our linked employer-
employee data set comprises approximately 1 million (estimation sample) full-time 
individuals aged between 19 and 65 years in 5,400 (western) German establishments. 
  Finally, we should note that not only is our key tenure variable censored. Earnings 
are top coded, too, and for roughly the same proportion of the sample (10 percent). For 
these individuals imputed earnings were generated using exactly the same procedure as 
was applied to obtain predicted tenure in respect of the top-coded tenure cases. 
    8
Findings 
Summary statistics of the (log) wage and tenure variables are given in Table 1. The 
information is presented by (predicted) wage quintiles and by gender. The most notable 
feature of the material is the suggestion that workers in establishments with works 
councils have generally higher wages than their counterparts in establishments without 
councils. This is most obviously the case for the first two skill quintiles and for females. 
For females in the lowest two quintiles the mean (log) wage differences are 0.33 and 
0.16, respectively, for those in works council establishments. The corresponding wage 
gaps for males are lower at 0.22 and 0.06, respectively. Job tenure is also materially 
longer in works councils plants for the lowest quintiles: by a 2.4 and 3.3-year (1.4 and 
2.9-year) margin in the case of females (males). Further, note that although the wage 
structure in (western) Germany is seemingly compact in all quintiles, the standard 
deviation of (log) wages is nevertheless always higher in the case of workers in 
establishments without works councils. 
(Table 1 near here) 
  The adjusted effect of works councils on individual wages according to equation 
(1) is given in Table 2. As before, separate results are provided by skill quintiles and by 
gender. Again note that we are seeking to capture the role of collective bargaining per se 
in a very simple and unrestricted way, namely, by dividing the subsamples into covered 
and uncovered sectors.  For all but four  of the twenty (= 5 x 4) quintile-specific 
regressions, the coefficient estimate for the works council variable is positive and 
statistically significant. The exceptions are uncovered males in quintiles 4 and 5 and 
uncovered females in quintiles 3 and 5 for whom the point estimates are statistically   9
insignificant. The main lesson to be drawn from the table is the robust wage premium of 
between 0.072 and 0.189 earned by females where a works council is present in both the 
covered and uncovered sectors. In contrast, the works council wage gap for males is 
considerably smaller, in the range 0.029 to 0.078. For each category of worker the broad 
tendency is for the works council premium to decrease in skill. 
(Table 2 near here) 
  Table 3 presents the results of fitting our tenure model, as specified in equations 
(2) and (3), to the data. In a first step, we run a single equation for each subsample, 
namely, covered and uncovered males and females. In column (a) we investigate whether 
there is evidence of longer job tenure in establishments with works councils, controlling 
for a variety of factors. In column (b) we consider the evidence on the relationship 
between the observed works council tenure gap and worker skills. 
(Table 3 near here) 
As is apparent, there is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that workers in plants 
with works councils have longer tenure. But this is only true for the covered sector, 
where female workers have approximately 1 more year of tenure and males 1.5 years. 
Turning to the results in column (b), there is also no evidence of any relationship between 
the works council tenure gap and skill. The latter finding is not surprising in the case of 
uncovered workers since there was no evidence of any works council tenure gap in their 
case (see the first and third columns of the table). More surprising is the finding that the 
average effect of predicted skill on the tenure gap is a wash. We would attribute this 
result more to aggregation than anything else. Arguably, the only convincing way to 
demonstrate the effect of works council presence on tenure and at the same time be able   10
to interpret the observed works council gap (i.e. to connect the observed higher works 
council wage gap for the least skilled workers – in quintile 1 – to rent-seeking behavior or 
otherwise) is to run models (2) and (3) for separate quintiles. 
(Table 4 near here) 
Table 4 provides this disaggregation. As can be seen from column (a) of the table 
we can confirm that, all else equal, both genders in quintile 1 have higher tenure of 
roughly one year in the covered sector. No such relation is reported for any of the other 
four quintiles. We therefore obtain the interesting result that those who enjoy additional 
gains from works council presence – low-skilled men and women in the covered sector – 
do have higher tenure. 
Column (b) of the table tests whether it is possible to detect within each quintile 
any evidence that the works council-tenure gap is decreasing in skill as well. We find no 
evidence of such an effect in quintile 1. And, given that the works council effect in 
column (a) is never statistically significant for the other quintiles, no well-determined 
interaction effects are found for quintiles 2 through 5 either – other than for a handful of 
instances for which we have no cogent explanation.  Given the compressed dispersion of 
German wages, it would seem that our derived measure of skill (based on predicted 
wages) is also very compact, generating data with insufficient variability per quintile.  
 
Conclusions 
There is evidence of a large wage gap favoring low-skilled workers in German works 
council establishments, especially for women. Since job tenure is also longer for these 
groups of workers, a crucial issue is whether the observed tenure gap is compatible with   11
rent-seeking behavior. Our empirical strategy follows Card and De la Rica (2006) in 
focusing on the works council institution, while also controlling for the presence of 
(predominantly sectoral) collective bargaining, and in running two separate (augmented) 
tenure equations: the first adding a works council dummy, and the second adding an 
interaction term between skill/predicted wages and the works council variables. 
Not surprisingly, our results differ somewhat from Card and de la Rica, who 
found that the works council wage premium in Spain is increasing in skill. That is to say, 
although in our case the association between skill level and the tenure gap is positive it 
fails to achieve statistical significance in a single equation framework. Running the 
tenure equation for separate skill quintiles though, we obtain the same basic result that 
those with the highest wage premium have the greatest tenure premium. It is just that 
their identity is different in the German case, constituting male and female workers in the 
lowest quintiles of the skill distribution. (As a matter of fact, given the compact nature of 
the German wage distribution, we did not anticipate finding a robust interaction term for 
all five quintiles.) 
In sum, we find that workers in works council establishments enjoying the highest 
wage premia are also those with a comparatively longer tenure. As a result, although we 
cannot be certain that the generous works council wage gap of low-skilled workers is 
necessarily a non-competitive rent, the observed pattern of job tenure across different 
skill subsamples is not after all inconsistent with rent-seeking behavior. For the future it 
will be interesting to get a firmer handle (than co-worker skills) on unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and in particular to ascertain whether the premium survives – or emerges   12
for other parts of the distribution – the shifting allocation of workers and firms between 
collective bargaining states. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Sectoral collective agreements are legally binding on all member firms of the relevant 
employers’ association and apply to all members of the relevant trade union at the place 
of work. In practice, employers typically extend the terms of the sectoral agreement to 
nonmembers as well, while other employers who are not members of the employers’ 
association often apply them voluntarily. Finally, there is provision for extension of the 
master agreement to nonparties at the behest of the Federal Ministry of Labor.  
2 So as to control for the “uncertainty in predicting wage outcomes” (Card and de la Rica, 
2006, p. 584). 
3 For a treatment of worker self-selection into works council status, see Addison, 
Teixeira, and Zwick (2010). 
4 Controlling for self-selection issues seems only to reduce the size of estimates, not their 
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Table 1. Selected Characteristics of Works Council and Non-Works Council 
Workers by Predicted Wage Quintiles. 
 
  Predicted wage quintile 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
       
Male workers       
  Non-works council sector:       
Mean log wage  4.16 (0.35)  4.46  (0.27)  4.62 ( 0.30)  4.80 (0.30)  5.03 (0.31) 
Average tenure (in years)  4.69 (6.68)  10.1 (9.62)  10.3 (9.82)  12.2 ( 9.94)  9.90 (8.63) 
  Works council sector:       
Mean log wage  4.38 (0.25)  4.52 (0.20)  4.62 (0.21)  4.80 (0.28)  5.05 (0.29) 
Average tenure (in years)  6.06 (7.79)  13.0 (9.68)  16.3 (9.61)  14.9 (10.75)  15.0 (9.93) 
  Works council gap:       
Mean  log  wage  difference  0.22 0.06 0,00 0,00 0,02 
Standard  deviation  difference  -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 
Average  tenure  difference  1.37 2.90 6.00 2.70 5.10 
Female workers       
  Non-works council sector:        
Mean log wage  3.83 (0.40)  4.17 (0.38)  4.35 (0.37)  4.49 (0.35)  4.67  (0.38) 
Average tenure (in years)  4.38 (6.19)  6.37 (7.13)  9.66 (8.24)  11.3 (8.67)  9.13 (8.49) 
  Works council sector:       
Mean log wage  4.16 (0.34)  4.33 (0.27)  4.46 (0.29)  4.58 (0.30)  4.76 (0.35) 
Average tenure (in years)  6.74 (7.82)  9.71 (9.01)  9.74  (8.46)  11.5 (9.25)  12.7 (9.24) 
  Works council gap:       
Mean  log  wage  difference  0.33 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.09 
Standard  deviation  difference  -0.06 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 
Average  tenure  difference    2.36 3.34 0.08 0.20 3.57 
       
Notes: Predicted wages are obtained on the basis of a standard earnings equation for the non-
works council sector (see equation (1)), which is then used to generate a predicted wage 
distribution for all workers in the sample – where workers in the first quintile in either sector have 
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Table 2. Estimated Works Council Effects on Wages in the Covered and Uncovered Sectors. 
 
  Predicted wage quintile 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
       










       










       










       











Notes: The works council coefficient estimates reported in each column of the table are 
obtained from separate earnings regressions for collective agreement regime, predicted wage 
quintile, and gender. The general model specification is equation (1), with the workplace 
representation dummy now added to the full set of regressors. These include dummies indicating 
sales in export markets, use of paid overtime, the profit situation, and industry dummies. The 
share of workers of non-German nationality and the average characteristics of co-workers are also 
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  Uncovered Covered 
       
  (a) (b)  (a)  (b) 
       
Male workers       
Interaction term 





       








    
N  20,011 738,314 
  
Female workers    
Interaction term 
















    
N  10,567 244,386 
       
Notes: The works council coefficient estimates reported in each column of the table are obtained 
from separate tenure regressions by collective agreement regime and gender. The model 
specifications for columns (a) and (b) are equations (2) and (3), respectively. The regressors 
include dummies indicating sales in export markets, use of paid overtime, the profit situation, and 
industry dummies. The share of workers of non-German nationality and the average 
characteristics of co-workers are also included in the specification, together with a full set of 
dummies for each single year of age. The dependent variable is the number of years elapsed since 
starting work with the present employer/establishment. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
  
1
8
T
a
b
l
e
 
4
.
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
W
o
r
k
e
r
 
T
e
n
u
r
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
U
n
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
s
,
 
b
y
 
W
a
g
e
 
Q
u
i
n
t
i
l
e
.
 
 
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
w
a
g
e
 
q
u
i
n
t
i
l
e
 
1
 
2
 
3
 
 
4
 
5
 
 
(
a
)
 
(
b
)
 
(
a
)
 
(
b
)
 
(
a
)
 
(
b
)
 
(
a
)
 
(
b
)
 
(
a
)
 
(
b
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
a
l
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
,
 
u
n
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
r
m
 
[
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
w
a
g
e
 
*
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
]
 
 
0
.
4
4
8
 
 
 
(
1
.
5
4
1
)
 
 
1
.
3
2
9
 
 
 
(
3
.
9
9
6
)
 
 
-
0
.
3
4
5
6
 
 
 
(
4
.
7
2
9
)
 
 
2
.
3
8
9
 
 
 
(
3
.
8
0
7
)
 
 
1
7
.
8
8
1
 
 
 
(
6
.
7
5
3
)
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
0
.
4
9
6
 
 
 
(
0
.
5
9
4
)
 
-
1
.
3
7
7
 
 
 
(
6
.
2
4
9
)
 
0
.
4
8
8
 
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
8
0
0
)
 
-
5
.
4
0
2
 
 
 
(
1
7
.
6
6
3
)
 
-
0
.
4
9
4
 
 
 
(
0
.
7
1
1
)
 
1
.
0
9
8
 
 
 
(
2
1
.
7
8
3
)
 
-
0
.
5
5
7
 
(
0
.
6
3
6
)
 
-
1
1
.
9
1
9
 
 
 
(
1
8
.
2
4
7
)
 
0
.
0
8
2
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
9
3
2
)
 
-
8
9
.
4
0
3
 
 
 
(
3
3
.
2
7
1
)
 
N
 
7
,
1
4
0
 
2
,
4
7
6
 
2
,
9
2
1
 
3
,
4
2
2
 
4
,
0
5
2
 
M
a
l
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
,
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
r
m
 
[
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
w
a
g
e
 
*
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
]
 
 
-
0
.
3
9
3
 
 
 
(
0
.
8
0
9
)
 
 
5
.
4
3
4
 
 
 
(
1
.
7
5
0
)
 
 
0
.
8
4
7
 
 
 
(
2
.
1
4
2
)
 
 
-
1
.
8
3
6
 
 
 
(
2
.
5
6
4
)
 
 
2
.
4
4
9
 
 
 
(
2
.
3
7
4
)
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
1
.
3
0
3
 
 
 
(
0
.
2
2
1
)
 
2
.
9
5
5
 
 
 
(
3
.
3
9
3
)
 
-
0
.
2
6
2
 
 
 
 
0
.
3
2
1
)
 
-
2
4
.
4
5
4
 
 
 
(
7
.
7
8
7
)
 
0
.
1
0
6
 
 
 
(
0
.
3
2
2
)
 
-
3
.
7
9
6
 
 
 
(
9
.
8
7
4
)
 
0
.
5
0
9
 
 
 
(
0
.
4
5
5
)
 
9
.
2
8
2
 
 
 
(
1
2
.
3
3
5
)
 
0
.
1
1
5
 
 
 
(
0
.
4
7
4
)
 
-
1
2
.
1
2
1
 
 
 
(
1
1
.
9
1
5
)
 
N
 
1
4
4
,
0
6
8
 
1
4
8
,
5
1
7
 
1
4
8
,
8
7
1
 
1
4
8
,
8
8
0
 
1
4
7
,
9
7
8
 
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
,
 
u
n
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
r
m
 
[
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
w
a
g
e
 
*
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
]
 
 
-
6
.
2
1
2
 
 
 
2
.
1
1
3
 
 
-
1
2
.
2
6
8
 
 
 
(
3
.
4
8
6
)
 
 
-
4
.
2
6
3
 
 
 
(
4
.
0
8
6
)
 
 
-
3
.
5
5
9
 
 
 
(
4
.
7
3
7
)
 
 
3
.
1
7
0
 
 
 
 
(
4
.
6
5
9
)
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
1
.
0
4
8
 
 
 
(
0
.
6
2
5
)
 
 
2
5
.
0
5
4
 
 
 
(
8
.
1
2
5
)
 
-
0
.
4
4
3
 
 
 
0
.
6
7
7
)
 
5
0
.
5
4
8
 
 
 
(
1
4
.
4
2
6
)
 
-
0
.
4
0
8
 
 
 
(
0
.
7
2
8
)
 
1
8
.
1
1
7
 
 
 
(
1
7
.
5
9
5
)
 
-
1
.
5
2
1
 
 
 
(
0
.
7
5
9
)
 
1
3
.
8
0
8
 
 
 
(
2
1
.
0
2
3
)
 
0
.
2
9
7
 
 
 
(
0
.
5
9
6
)
 
-
1
4
.
3
1
3
 
 
 
(
2
1
.
5
8
5
)
 
N
 
2
,
9
3
0
 
2
,
2
4
6
 
2
,
1
3
4
 
1
,
7
7
7
 
1
,
4
8
0
 
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
,
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
r
m
 
[
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
w
a
g
e
 
*
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
]
 
 
0
.
7
6
7
 
 
 
(
0
.
9
5
9
)
 
 
-
2
.
1
0
7
 
 
 
 
(
1
.
9
3
2
)
 
 
1
2
.
9
9
3
 
 
 
(
3
.
1
9
9
)
 
 
-
0
.
6
3
8
 
 
 
(
3
.
3
2
8
)
 
 
1
.
7
0
5
 
 
 
 
(
3
.
3
3
6
)
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
1
.
1
0
8
 
 
 
(
0
.
2
4
6
)
 
-
1
.
8
7
2
 
 
 
(
3
.
7
3
9
)
 
-
0
.
1
4
8
 
 
 
0
.
2
7
5
)
 
8
.
6
5
4
 
 
 
(
8
.
1
5
5
)
 
-
0
.
4
2
3
 
 
 
(
0
.
3
9
1
)
 
-
5
6
.
3
1
4
 
 
 
 
(
1
3
.
7
6
7
)
 
-
0
.
5
3
2
 
 
 
(
0
.
4
5
7
)
 
2
.
1
7
1
 
 
 
(
1
4
.
7
6
4
)
 
-
0
.
5
2
2
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
4
3
7
)
 
-
8
.
3
3
4
 
 
 
(
1
5
.
4
7
3
)
 
N
 
4
8
,
0
0
9
 
4
9
,
0
5
4
 
4
8
,
7
4
2
 
4
9
,
0
1
8
 
4
9
,
5
6
3
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
T
h
e
 
w
o
r
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
a
r
e
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
 
t
e
n
u
r
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
b
y
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
g
i
m
e
,
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
w
a
g
e
 
q
u
i
n
t
i
l
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
g
e
n
d
e
r
.
 
T
h
e
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
(
a
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
b
)
 
a
r
e
 
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
2
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
3
)
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
(
s
e
e
 
n
o
t
e
s
 
t
o
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
3
)
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
 